

Formal Specification and Verification

Classical logic (5)

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Until now

- Propositional logic

Limitations of Propositional Logic

- Fixed, finite number of objects

Cannot express: let G be group with arbitrary number of elements

- No functions or relations with arguments

Can express: finite function/relation table p_{ij}

Cannot express: properties of function/relation on all arguments,
e.g., $+$ is associative

- Static interpretation

Programs change value of their variables, e.g., via assignment, call, etc.

Propositional formulas look at one single interpretation at a time

Beyond the Limitations of Propositional Logic

- First order logic
(+ functions)
- Temporal logic
(+ computations)
- Dynamic logic
(+ computations + functions)

Beyond the Limitations of Propositional Logic

- First order logic

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Part 2: First-Order Logic

Syntax:

- non-logical symbols (domain-specific)
⇒ terms, atomic formulas
- logical symbols (domain-independent)
⇒ Boolean combinations, quantifiers

Signature

A signature $\Sigma = (\Omega, \Pi)$, fixes an alphabet of non-logical symbols, where

- Ω is a set of **function symbols** f with **arity** $n \geq 0$ (written f/n)
- Π is a set of **predicate symbols** p with **arity** $m \geq 0$ (written p/m)

If $n = 0$ then f is also called a **constant (symbol)**.

If $m = 0$ then p is also called a **propositional variable**.

Many-sorted Signature A many-sorted signature $\Sigma = (S, \Omega, \Pi)$, fixes an alphabet of non-logical symbols, where

- S is a set of sorts,
- Ω is a set of **function symbols** f with **arity** $a(f) = s_1 \dots s_n \rightarrow s$,
- Π is a set of **predicate symbols** p with **arity** $a(p) = s_1 \dots s_m$

where s_1, \dots, s_n, s_m, s are sorts.

Variables

Predicate logic admits the formulation of abstract, schematic assertions.
(Object) variables are the technical tool for schematization.

We assume that

X

is a given countably infinite set of symbols which we use for (the denotation of) **variables**.

Many-sorted case:

We assume that for every sort $s \in S$, X_s is a given countably infinite set of symbols which we use for (the denotation of) **variables** of sort s .

Terms

Terms over Σ (resp., Σ -terms) are formed according to these syntactic rules:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} t, u, v & ::= & x \quad , x \in X \quad \text{(variable)} \\ & | & f(t_1, \dots, t_n) \quad , f/n \in \Omega \quad \text{(functional term)} \end{array}$$

By $T_\Sigma(X)$ we denote the set of Σ -terms (over X).

A term not containing any variable is called a **ground term**.

By T_Σ we denote the set of Σ -ground terms.

Many-sorted case:

a variable $x \in X_s$ is a term of sort s

if $a(f) = s_1 \dots s_n \rightarrow s$, and t_i are terms of sort s_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$ then $f(t_1, \dots, t_n)$ is a term of sort s .

Atoms

Atoms (also called atomic formulas) over Σ are formed according to this syntax:

$$A, B ::= p(t_1, \dots, t_m) \quad , p/m \in \Pi$$
$$\left[\quad \mid \quad (t \approx t') \quad \text{(equation)} \quad \right]$$

Whenever we admit equations as atomic formulas we are in the realm of **first-order logic with equality**. Admitting equality does not really increase the expressiveness of first-order logic, (cf. exercises). But deductive systems where equality is treated specifically can be much more efficient.

Many-sorted case:

If $a(p) = s_1 \dots s_m$, we require that t_i is a term of sort s_i for $i = 1, \dots, m$.

Literals, Clauses

Literals

$L ::= A$ (positive literal)
| $\neg A$ (negative literal)

Clauses

$C, D ::= \perp$ (empty clause)
| $L_1 \vee \dots \vee L_k, k \geq 1$ (non-empty clause)

General First-Order Formulas

$F_{\Sigma}(X)$ is the set of first-order formulas over Σ defined as follows:

F, G, H	$::=$	\perp	(falsum)
		\top	(verum)
		A	(atomic formula)
		$\neg F$	(negation)
		$(F \wedge G)$	(conjunction)
		$(F \vee G)$	(disjunction)
		$(F \rightarrow G)$	(implication)
		$(F \leftrightarrow G)$	(equivalence)
		$\forall x F$	(universal quantification)
		$\exists x F$	(existential quantification)

Example: Peano Arithmetic

Signature:

$$\Sigma_{PA} = (\Omega_{PA}, \Pi_{PA})$$

$$\Omega_{PA} = \{0/0, +/2, */2, s/1\}$$

$$\Pi_{PA} = \{\leq /2, < /2\}$$

$$+, *, <, \leq \text{ infix; } * >_p + >_p < >_p \leq$$

Examples of formulas over this signature are:

$$\forall x, y (x \leq y \leftrightarrow \exists z (x + z \approx y))$$

$$\exists x \forall y (x + y \approx y)$$

$$\forall x, y (x * s(y) \approx x * y + x)$$

$$\forall x, y (s(x) \approx s(y) \rightarrow x \approx y)$$

$$\forall x \exists y (x < y \wedge \neg \exists z (x < z \wedge z < y))$$

Example: Specifying LISP lists

Signature:

$$\Sigma_{\text{Lists}} = (\Omega_{\text{Lists}}, \Pi_{\text{Lists}})$$

$$\Omega_{\text{Lists}} = \{\text{car}/1, \text{cdr}/1, \text{cons}/2\}$$

$$\Pi_{\text{Lists}} = \emptyset$$

Examples of formulae:

$$\forall x, y \quad \text{car}(\text{cons}(x, y)) \approx x$$

$$\forall x, y \quad \text{cdr}(\text{cons}(x, y)) \approx y$$

$$\forall x \quad \text{cons}(\text{car}(x), \text{cdr}(x)) \approx x$$

Many-sorted signatures

Example:

Signature

$$S = \{\text{array}, \text{index}, \text{element}\}$$

set of sorts

$$\Omega = \{\text{read}, \text{write}\}$$

$$a(\text{read}) = \text{array} \times \text{index} \rightarrow \text{element}$$

$$a(\text{write}) = \text{array} \times \text{index} \times \text{element} \rightarrow \text{array}$$

$$\Pi = \emptyset$$

$$X = \{X_s \mid s \in S\}$$

Examples of formulae:

$$\forall x : \text{array} \quad \forall i : \text{index} \quad \forall j : \text{index} \quad (i \approx j \rightarrow \text{write}(x, i, \text{read}(x, j)) \approx x)$$

$$\forall x : \text{array} \quad \forall y : \text{array} \quad (x \approx y \leftrightarrow \forall i : \text{index} \quad (\text{read}(x, i) \approx \text{read}(y, i)))$$

Bound and Free Variables

In $Qx F$, $Q \in \{\exists, \forall\}$, we call F the **scope** of the quantifier Qx .

An *occurrence* of a variable x is called **bound**, if it is inside the scope of a quantifier Qx .

Any other occurrence of a variable is called **free**.

Formulas without free variables are also called **closed formulas** or **sentential forms**.

Formulas without variables are called **ground**.

Bound and Free Variables

Example:

$$\overbrace{\forall y \quad (\overbrace{\forall x \quad p(x)}^{\text{scope}} \rightarrow q(x, y))}^{\text{scope}}$$

The occurrence of y is bound, as is the first occurrence of x . The second occurrence of x is a free occurrence.

Substitutions

Substitution is a fundamental operation on terms and formulas that occurs in all inference systems for first-order logic.

In general, **substitutions** are mappings

$$\sigma : X \rightarrow T_{\Sigma}(X)$$

such that the **domain** of σ , that is, the set

$$\text{dom}(\sigma) = \{x \in X \mid \sigma(x) \neq x\},$$

is finite. The set of variables **introduced** by σ , that is, the set of variables occurring in one of the terms $\sigma(x)$, with $x \in \text{dom}(\sigma)$, is denoted by **codom**(σ).

Substitutions

Substitutions are often written as $[s_1/x_1, \dots, s_n/x_n]$, with x_i pairwise distinct, and then denote the mapping

$$[s_1/x_1, \dots, s_n/x_n](y) = \begin{cases} s_i, & \text{if } y = x_i \\ y, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

We also write $x\sigma$ for $\sigma(x)$.

The **modification** of a substitution σ at x is defined as follows:

$$\sigma[x \mapsto t](y) = \begin{cases} t, & \text{if } y = x \\ \sigma(y), & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Why Substitution is Complicated

We define the application of a substitution σ to a term t or formula F by structural induction over the syntactic structure of t or F by the equations depicted on the next page.

In the presence of quantification it is surprisingly complex:

We need to make sure that the (free) variables in the codomain of σ are not *captured* upon placing them into the scope of a quantifier Qy , hence the bound variable must be renamed into a “fresh”, that is, previously unused, variable z .

Application of a Substitution

“Homomorphic” extension of σ to terms and formulas:

$$f(s_1, \dots, s_n)\sigma = f(s_1\sigma, \dots, s_n\sigma)$$

$$\perp\sigma = \perp$$

$$\top\sigma = \top$$

$$p(s_1, \dots, s_n)\sigma = p(s_1\sigma, \dots, s_n\sigma)$$

$$(u \approx v)\sigma = (u\sigma \approx v\sigma)$$

$$\neg F\sigma = \neg(F\sigma)$$

$$(F\rho G)\sigma = (F\sigma\rho G\sigma) ; \text{ for each binary connective } \rho$$

$$(Qx F)\sigma = Qz (F\sigma[x \mapsto z]) ; \text{ with } z \text{ a fresh variable}$$

2.2 Semantics

To give semantics to a logical system means to define a notion of truth for the formulas. The concept of truth that we will now define for first-order logic goes back to Tarski.

As in the propositional case, we use a two-valued logic with truth values “true” and “false” denoted by 1 and 0, respectively.

Structures

A Σ -algebra (also called Σ -interpretation or Σ -structure) is a triple

$$\mathcal{A} = (U, (f_{\mathcal{A}} : U^n \rightarrow U)_{f/n \in \Omega}, (p_{\mathcal{A}} \subseteq U^m)_{p/m \in \Pi})$$

where $U \neq \emptyset$ is a set, called the **universe** of \mathcal{A} .

Normally, by abuse of notation, we will have \mathcal{A} denote both the algebra and its universe.

By $\Sigma\text{-Alg}$ we denote the class of all Σ -algebras.

Many-sorted Structures

A many-sorted Σ -algebra (also called Σ -interpretation or Σ -structure), where $\Sigma = (S, \Omega, \Pi)$ is a triple

$$\mathcal{A} = \left(\{U_s\}_{s \in S}, \left(f_{\mathcal{A}} : U_{s_1} \times \dots \times U_{s_n} \rightarrow U_s \right)_{\substack{f \in \Omega, \\ a(f) = s_1 \dots s_n \rightarrow s}}, \left(p_{\mathcal{A}} : U_{s_1} \times \dots \times U_{s_m} \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \right)_{\substack{p \in \Pi, \\ a(p) = s_1 \dots s_m}} \right)$$

where

- $U_s \neq \emptyset$ is a set, called the **universe of sort s** of \mathcal{A} , and
- $U_s \cap U_{s'} = \emptyset$ if $s \neq s'$.

Assignments

A variable has no intrinsic meaning. The meaning of a variable has to be defined externally (explicitly or implicitly in a given context) by an assignment.

A (variable) assignment, also called a valuation (over a given Σ -algebra \mathcal{A}), is a map $\beta : X \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$.

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Many-sorted case:

$$\beta = \{\beta_s\}_{s \in S}, \beta_s : X_s \rightarrow U_s$$

Value of a Term in \mathcal{A} with Respect to β

By structural induction we define

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta) : T_{\Sigma}(X) \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$$

as follows:

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(x) = \beta(x), \quad x \in X$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(f(s_1, \dots, s_n)) = f_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathcal{A}(\beta)(s_1), \dots, \mathcal{A}(\beta)(s_n)), \quad f/n \in \Omega$$

Value of a Term in \mathcal{A} with Respect to β

In the scope of a quantifier we need to evaluate terms with respect to modified assignments. To that end, let $\beta[x \mapsto a] : X \rightarrow \mathcal{A}$, for $x \in X$ and $a \in \mathcal{A}$, denote the assignment

$$\beta[x \mapsto a](y) := \begin{cases} a & \text{if } x = y \\ \beta(y) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Truth Value of a Formula in \mathcal{A} with Respect to β

$\mathcal{A}(\beta) : F_{\Sigma}(X) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is defined inductively as follows:

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\perp) = 0$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\top) = 1$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(p(s_1, \dots, s_n)) = p_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathcal{A}(\beta)(s_1), \dots, \mathcal{A}(\beta)(s_n))$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(s \approx t) = 1 \iff \mathcal{A}(\beta)(s) = \mathcal{A}(\beta)(t)$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\neg F) = 1 \iff \mathcal{A}(\beta)(F) = 0$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F \rho G) = B_{\rho}(\mathcal{A}(\beta)(F), \mathcal{A}(\beta)(G))$$

with B_{ρ} the Boolean function associated with ρ

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\forall x F) = \min_{a \in U} \{ \mathcal{A}(\beta[x \mapsto a])(F) \}$$

$$\mathcal{A}(\beta)(\exists x F) = \max_{a \in U} \{ \mathcal{A}(\beta[x \mapsto a])(F) \}$$

Example

The “Standard” Interpretation for Peano Arithmetic:

$$U_{\mathbb{N}} = \{0, 1, 2, \dots\}$$

$$0_{\mathbb{N}} = 0$$

$$s_{\mathbb{N}} : U_{\mathbb{N}} \rightarrow U_{\mathbb{N}} \quad s_{\mathbb{N}}(n) = n + 1$$

$$+_{\mathbb{N}} : U_{\mathbb{N}}^2 \rightarrow U_{\mathbb{N}} \quad +_{\mathbb{N}}(n, m) = n + m$$

$$*_{\mathbb{N}} : U_{\mathbb{N}}^2 \rightarrow U_{\mathbb{N}} \quad *_{\mathbb{N}}(n, m) = n * m$$

$$\leq_{\mathbb{N}} : U_{\mathbb{N}}^2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \quad \leq_{\mathbb{N}}(n, m) = 1 \text{ iff } n \text{ less than or equal to } m$$

$$<_{\mathbb{N}} : U_{\mathbb{N}}^2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \quad \leq_{\mathbb{N}}(n, m) = 1 \text{ iff } n \text{ less than } m$$

Note that \mathbb{N} is just one out of many possible Σ_{PA} -interpretations.

Example

Values over \mathbb{N} for Sample Terms and Formulas:

Under the assignment $\beta : x \mapsto 1, y \mapsto 3$ we obtain

$$\mathbb{N}(\beta)(s(x) + s(0)) = 3$$

$$\mathbb{N}(\beta)(x + y \approx s(y)) = 1$$

$$\mathbb{N}(\beta)(\forall x, y (x + y \approx y + x)) = 1$$

$$\mathbb{N}(\beta)(\forall z \ z \leq y) = 0$$

$$\mathbb{N}(\beta)(\forall x \exists y \ x < y) = 1$$

2.3 Models, Validity, and Satisfiability

F is **valid** in \mathcal{A} under assignment β :

$$\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F \quad :\Leftrightarrow \quad \mathcal{A}(\beta)(F) = 1$$

F is **valid** in \mathcal{A} (\mathcal{A} is a **model** of F):

$$\mathcal{A} \models F \quad :\Leftrightarrow \quad \mathcal{A}, \beta \models F, \text{ for all } \beta \in X \rightarrow U_{\mathcal{A}}$$

F is **valid** (or is a **tautology**):

$$\models F \quad :\Leftrightarrow \quad \mathcal{A} \models F, \text{ for all } \mathcal{A} \in \Sigma\text{-alg}$$

F is called **satisfiable** iff there exist \mathcal{A} and β such that $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F$.
Otherwise F is called **unsatisfiable**.

Entailment and Equivalence

F entails (implies) G (or G is a consequence of F), written $F \models G$

$:\Leftrightarrow$ for all $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma\text{-alg}$ and $\beta \in X \rightarrow U_{\mathcal{A}}$,
whenever $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F$ then $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models G$.

F and G are called **equivalent**

$:\Leftrightarrow$ for all $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma\text{-alg}$ und $\beta \in X \rightarrow U_{\mathcal{A}}$ we have
 $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F \Leftrightarrow \mathcal{A}, \beta \models G$.

Entailment and Equivalence

Proposition 2.6:

F entails G iff $(F \rightarrow G)$ is valid

Proposition 2.7:

F and G are equivalent iff $(F \leftrightarrow G)$ is valid.

Extension to sets of formulas N in the “natural way”, e.g., $N \models F$

$:\Leftrightarrow$ for all $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma\text{-alg}$ and $\beta \in X \rightarrow U_{\mathcal{A}}$:
if $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models G$, for all $G \in N$, then $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F$.

Validity vs. Unsatisfiability

Validity and unsatisfiability are just two sides of the same medal as explained by the following proposition.

Proposition 2.8:

$$F \text{ valid} \iff \neg F \text{ unsatisfiable}$$

Hence in order to design a theorem prover (validity checker) it is sufficient to design a checker for unsatisfiability.

Q: In a similar way, entailment $N \models F$ can be reduced to unsatisfiability. How?

Algorithmic Problems

Validity(F): $\models F$?

Satisfiability(F): F satisfiable?

Entailment(F, G): does F entail G ?

Model(\mathcal{A}, F): $\mathcal{A} \models F$?

Solve(\mathcal{A}, F): find an assignment β such that $\mathcal{A}, \beta \models F$

Solve(F): find a substitution σ such that $\models F\sigma$

Abduce(F): find G with “certain properties” such that G entails F

Decidability/Undecidability



In 1931, Gödel published his incompleteness theorems in
“Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der
Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme”
(in English “On Formally Undecidable Propositions of
Principia Mathematica and Related Systems”).

He proved for any computable axiomatic system that is powerful enough to describe the arithmetic of the natural numbers (e.g. the Peano axioms or Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice), that:

- If the system is consistent, it cannot be complete.
- The consistency of the axioms cannot be proven within the system.

Decidability/Undecidability

These theorems ended a half-century of attempts, beginning with the work of Frege and culminating in Principia Mathematica and Hilbert's formalism, to find a set of axioms sufficient for all mathematics.

The incompleteness theorems also imply that not all mathematical questions are computable.

Consequences of Gödel's Famous Theorems

1. For most signatures Σ , validity is undecidable for Σ -formulas.
(One can easily encode Turing machines in most signatures.)
2. For each signature Σ , the set of valid Σ -formulas is recursively enumerable.
(This is proved by giving complete deduction systems.)
3. For $\Sigma = \Sigma_{PA}$ and $\mathbb{N}_* = (\mathbb{N}, 0, s, +, *)$, the theory $Th(\mathbb{N}_*)$ is not recursively enumerable.

These undecidability results motivate the study of subclasses of formulas (**fragments**) of first-order logic

Q: Can you think of any fragments of first-order logic for which validity is decidable?

Some Decidable Fragments/Problems

Validity/Satisfiability/Entailment: Some decidable fragments:

- Variable-free formulas without equality: satisfiability is NP-complete. (why?)
- Variable-free Horn clauses (clauses with at most one positive atom): entailment is decidable in linear time.
- **Monadic class:** no function symbols, all predicates unary; validity is NEXPTIME-complete.
- Q: Other decidable fragments of FOL (with variables)?
Which methods for proving decidability?

Decidable problems.

Finite model checking is decidable in time polynomial in the size of the structure and the formula.

Calculi

There exist Hilbert style calculi and sequent calculi for first-order logic.

Checking satisfiability of formulae:

- Resolution
- Semantic tableaux

Verification: Logical theories

Theory of a Structure

Let $\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma\text{-alg}$. The (first-order) theory of \mathcal{A} is defined as

$$Th(\mathcal{A}) = \{G \in F_{\Sigma}(X) \mid \mathcal{A} \models G\}$$

Problem of axiomatizability:

For which structures \mathcal{A} can one axiomatize $Th(\mathcal{A})$, that is, can one write down a formula F (or a recursively enumerable set F of formulas) such that

$$Th(\mathcal{A}) = \{G \mid F \models G\}?$$

Analogously for sets of structures.

Two Interesting Theories

Let $\Sigma_{Pres} = (\{0/0, s/1, +/2\}, \emptyset)$ and $\mathbb{Z}_+ = (\mathbb{Z}, 0, s, +)$ its standard interpretation on the integers.

$Th(\mathbb{Z}_+)$ is called **Presburger arithmetic** (M. Presburger, 1929).

(There is no essential difference when one, instead of \mathbb{Z} , considers the natural numbers \mathbb{N} as standard interpretation.)

Presburger arithmetic is decidable in 3EXPTIME (D. Oppen, JCSS, 16(3):323–332, 1978), and in 2EXPSPACE, using automata-theoretic methods (and there is a constant $c \geq 0$ such that $Th(\mathbb{Z}_+) \notin \text{NTIME}(2^{2^{cn}})$).

Two Interesting Theories

However, $\mathbb{N}_* = (\mathbb{N}, 0, s, +, *)$, the standard interpretation of $\Sigma_{PA} = (\{0/0, s/1, +/2, */2\}, \emptyset)$, has as theory the so-called **Peano arithmetic** which is undecidable, not even recursively enumerable.

Note: The choice of signature can make a big difference with regard to the computational complexity of theories.

Logical theories

Syntactic view

first-order theory: given by a set \mathcal{F} of (closed) first-order Σ -formulae.

the **models** of \mathcal{F} : $\text{Mod}(\mathcal{F}) = \{\mathcal{A} \in \Sigma\text{-alg} \mid \mathcal{A} \models G, \text{ for all } G \text{ in } \mathcal{F}\}$

Semantic view

given a class \mathcal{M} of Σ -algebras

the **first-order theory** of \mathcal{M} : $\text{Th}(\mathcal{M}) = \{G \in F_{\Sigma}(X) \text{ closed} \mid \mathcal{M} \models G\}$

Theories

\mathcal{F} set of (closed) first-order formulae

$$\text{Mod}(\mathcal{F}) = \{A \in \Sigma\text{-alg} \mid A \models G, \text{ for all } G \text{ in } \mathcal{F}\}$$

\mathcal{M} class of Σ -algebras

$$\text{Th}(\mathcal{M}) = \{G \in F_{\Sigma}(X) \text{ closed} \mid \mathcal{M} \models G\}$$

$\text{Th}(\text{Mod}(\mathcal{F}))$ the set of formulae true in all models of \mathcal{F}
represents exactly the set of consequences of \mathcal{F}

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Note: $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \text{Th}(\text{Mod}(\mathcal{F}))$ (typically strict)

$\mathcal{M} \subseteq \text{Mod}(\text{Th}(\mathcal{M}))$ (typically strict)